

Detection and Prevention of Blackhole Attack, Wormhole Attack in MANET Using ACO

A. Radhika, Dr. D.Haritha

Abstract— (Mobile Adhoc network) is a infrastructure less network used for wireless communication. MANET can be built with the mobile nodes which can move anywhere at any time. This results into the dynamic topology of MANET. Each node is responsible for routing the message from one node to the other like a router, causes network more vulnerable to the different attacks. In this paper we will discuss Black Hole Attack a type of DOS attack and Worm Hole Attack. The emphasis of this paper is find detection method and prevention of these attacks in manets using Antnet Routing algorithm based on Ant Colony Optimization(ACO) framework.

Index Terms— DOS attack, Black hole attack,Worm hole attack

I. INTRODUCTION

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is relatively new communication paradigm. MANET has received spectacular consideration because of their self-configuration and self-maintenance. Early research assumed a friendly and cooperative environment of wireless network. As a result they focused on problems such as wireless channel access and multi hop routing. But security has become a primary concern to provide protected communication between mobile nodes in a hostile environment.

Although mobile ad hoc networks have several advantages over wired networks, on the other side they pose a number of non-trivial challenges to the security design as they are more vulnerable than wired networks [1]. These challenges include open network architecture, shared wireless medium, demanding resource constraints, and, highly dynamic network topology.

In this paper, we have considered a fundamental security problem in MANET. To protect its basic functionality to deliver data bits from one node to another. Nodes help each other in conveying information to and fro and thereby creating a virtual set of connections between each other. Routing protocols play an very imperative role in the creation and maintenance of these connections.

In contrast to wired networks, each node in an ad-hoc networks acts like a router and forwards packets to other peer nodes. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate network users and malicious attackers. As a result, there is a blurry boundary separating the inside network from the outside world.

Many different types of routing protocols have been developed for ad hoc networks and have been classified into two main categories as Proactive (periodic) protocols and

Reactive (on-demand) protocols which has been clearly explained in [2] and [3]. Wireless ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, active interfering, impersonation, and denial-of-service. A single solution cannot resolve all the different types of attacks in ad hoc networks. In this paper, we have designed a novel method to detect black hole attack: ACO, which isolates that malicious node from the network. We have complemented the reactive system on every node on the network. This agent stores the Destination sequence number of incoming route reply packets in the routing table and calculates the threshold value to evaluate the dynamic training data in every time interval as in [4]. Our solution makes the participating nodes realize that, one of their neighbors is malicious; the node thereafter is not allowed to participate in packet forwarding operation[5].

II. ANTNET

AntNet is an instance of an ACO algorithm for distributed and adaptive routing in Communication networks. In distributed adaptive routing at each network node the routing policy is continually adapted to the variations in the input traffic patterns.

The basic principle of an ant routing algorithm is that ants deposit on the ground a pheromone, while they roam looking for food. Ants can also smell pheromone and tend to follow with higher probability those paths characterized by strong pheromone concentrations. The pheromone trails allow the ants to find their way to the food source (or back to the nest). The same pheromone trails can be used by another ants. This pheromone-trail-following behaviour gives raise to the emergence of the shortest path. An ant routing algorithm can be briefly described in the following way in Fig. 1




Fig 1 : Basic principle of ant routing paradigm.

From each network node, a number of discovery packets (forward ants) are sent towards the selected destination nodes. They propagate concurrently and independently. In each node routing tables consists of stochastic tables, used to select next hops according to weighted probabilities. These probabilities are calculated on the basis of the pheromone trails left by previous ants which is as shown below:

Destination node	1	...	j	...	k-1	k+1	...	N
Next node	l_1	...	l_j	...	l_{k-1}	l_{k+1}	...	l_N

Fig 2 : Routing Tables

Ant's Pheromone trail depositing

$$\tau_{ijd}^k(t+1) \leftarrow (1 - \rho) \cdot \tau_{ijd}^k(t) + \Delta \tau_{ijd}^k(t)$$

While moving, the ants deposit pheromone on the path links, i.e., in the node routing tables they change the probability to select a particular next hop. Once a forward ant gets to the destination node, it first generates a backward ant and then dies. This way, the new packet created and sent back to the source will propagate through the same path selected by the forward ant.

On its way back, the backward ant deposits pheromone on the reverse path links. Thus it updates the routing table of the nodes along the path. Once it has returned to the source node, the backward ant dies. A distributed heuristic solution like the ant routing displays several features making it particularly suitable in ad hoc networks[6].

However research has shown that in MANETs, the best path for routing (considering the overall network benefit as well as node benefit) is not necessarily the shortest path but instead the path which optimizes number of hops (length of path), congestion along path and load balancing[8].

The basic steps under ACO System

III. ANT COLONY OPTIMIZATION(ACO) SYSTEM:

- 1) Starting node is selected at random.
- 2) Path is selected randomly based upon: amount of "Pheromone trail" present on possible paths from starting node.
- 3) Higher probability for paths with more "trail". Ant reaches next node, selects next path. Continues until reaches starting node. Finished "tour" is a solution.
- 4) A completed tour is analyzed for optimality. Higher probability of ant selecting path that is part of a better-performing tour.
- 5) New cycle is performed. Repeated until most ants select the same tour on every cycle (convergence to solution).


IV. ATTACKS IN ACO BASED MANETS

MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks. General attack types are the threats against Physical, MAC, and network layer which are the most important layers that function for the routing mechanism of the ad hoc network. Attacks in the network layer have generally two purposes: not forwarding the packets or adding and changing some parameters of routing messages. Black hole is one of the major threat.

A. Blackhole Attack


In Blackhole attack, the malicious node waits for the neighbors to initiate a FORWARD ANT packet. As the node receives the FORWARD ANT packet, it will immediately send a false BACKWARD ANT packet with a modified higher sequence number. So, that the source node assumes that node is having the fresh route towards the destination. The source node ignores the BACKWARD ANT packet received from other nodes and begins to send the data packets over malicious node. A malicious node takes all the routes towards itself. It does not allow forwarding any packet anywhere. This attack is called a Black hole as it swallows all objects[9].

In figure 4 source node S wants to send data packets to a destination node D in the network.



Node M is a malicious node which acts as a blackhole. The attacker replies with false reply BACKWARD ANT having higher modified sequence number. So, data communication initiates from S towards M instead of D.

Experimentation was done on Antnet routing algorithm using NS2 simulator by transmitting data between nodes using UDP agent and CBR traffic. Sender sends the data via attacker. Source node transfers data to attacker that does not have shortest route to Destination. Attacker does not forward data to its neighbors.



B. Solution Against Black Hole Attack


In normal ACO, the node that receives the BACKWARD ANT packet first checks the value of sequence number in its routing table. The BACKWARD ANT packet is accepted if it has BACKWARD_ANT_sequence number is higher than the threshold value. The threshold value is dynamically. Updated

as in [4] in every time interval. As the value of BACKWARD ANT_sequence_number is found to be higher than the threshold value, the node is suspected to be malicious and it adds the node to the black list. As the node detected an anomaly, it sends a new control packet, ALARM to its neighbours. The ALARM packet has the black list node as a parameter so that, the neighbouring nodes know that BACKWARD ANT packet from the node is to be discarded. Further, if any node receives the BACKWARD ANT packet, it looks over the list, if the reply is from the blacklisted node; no processing is done for the same. It simply ignores the node and does not receive reply from that node again. So, in this way, the malicious node is isolated from the network by the ALARM packet. The continuous replies from the malicious node are blocked, which results in less routing overhead. Moreover, unlike ACO, if the node is found to be malicious, the routing table for that node is not updated, nor the packet is forwarded to another node.


The threshold value is dynamically updated using the data collected in the time interval. If the initial training data were used, then the system could not adapt the changing environment. The threshold value is the average of the difference of destination sequence number in each time slot between the sequence number in the routing table and the BACKWARD ANT packet. The time interval to update the threshold value is as soon as a newer node receives a BACKWARD ANT packet. As a new node receives a BACKWARD ANT for the first time, it gets the updated value of the threshold. So our design not only detects the Black hole attack, but tries to prevent it further, by updating threshold which reflects the real changing environment. Other nodes are also updated about the malicious act by an ALARM packet, and they react to it by isolating the malicious node from network.

C. Worm Hole Attack

A wormhole attack is a particularly severe attack on MANET routing where two attackers, connected by a high-speed off-channel link, are strategically placed at different ends of a network. Consider Figure in which node A sends RREQ to sink node, and nodes M1 and M2 are malicious nodes having an out-of-band channel between them. Node M1 "tunnels" the RREQ to M2, which is legitimate neighbor of sink node. Sink node gets two RREQ – S-A-B-C-Sink and AM1-M2-Sink-B. The second route is shorter and faster than the first, and chosen by sink. Since the transmission between two nodes has rely on relay nodes, many routing protocols have been proposed for ad hoc network. In a wormhole attack, attackers "tunnel" packets to another area of the network bypassing normal routes as shown in Figure 3. The resulting route through the wormhole may have lower hop count than normal routes. With this leverage, attackers using wormhole can easily manipulate the routing priority in MANET to perform eavesdropping, packet modification or perform a DOS attack. The entire routing system in MANET can even be brought down using the wormhole attack [7].




Experimentation was done on Antnet routing algorithm using NS2 simulator by transmitting data between nodes using UDP agent and CBR traffic. An adversary forms tunnel with other adversary using a direct low latency communication link.



D. Solution against Worm Hole attack

Packet leash [2] is a mechanism for detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks. A leash is any information that is added to a packet designed to restrict the packets maximum allowed transmission distance. The mechanism proposes two types of leashes for this purpose: Geographic and Temporal. In Geographic Leashes, each node knows its precise position and all nodes have a loosely synchronized clock. Each node, before sending a packet, appends its current position and transmission time to it. The receiving node, on receipt of the packet, computes the distance to the sender and the time it took the packet to traverse the path. The receiver can use this distance anytime information to deduce whether the received packet passed through wormhole or not. In Temporal Leashes, the sender appends the sending time to the packet and the receiving node computes a travelling distance of that packet assuming propagation at the speed of the light and using the difference between packet sending time and packet receiving time.



V. APPLICATIONS

Ad-hoc networks are suited for use in situations where an infrastructure is unavailable or to deploy one is not cost effective. One of many possible uses of mobile ad-hoc networks is in some business environments, where the need for collaborative computing might be more important outside the office environment than inside, such as in a business meeting outside the office to brief clients on a given assignment. Work has been going on to introduce the fundamental concepts of game theory and its applications in telecommunications. A mobile ad-hoc network can also be used to provide crisis management services applications, such as in disaster recovery, where the entire communication infrastructure is destroyed and resorting communication quickly is crucial. By using a mobile ad-hoc network, an infrastructure could be set up in hours instead of weeks, as is required in the case of wired line communication. Another application example of a mobile ad-hoc network is Bluetooth, which is designed to support a personal area network by eliminating the need of wires between various devices, such as printers and personal digital assistants.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have used a very simple and effective way of providing security against Black hole attack by introducing some modifications to ACO. The ACO algorithm is efficient in providing an optimal path for the reasons like, it is fully distributed implies there is no single point of failure; the operations to be performed in each node are very simple; the algorithm is based on an asynchronous and autonomous interaction of agents; it is self-organizing, thus robust and fault tolerant implies there is no need of defining path recovery algorithms; it is intrinsically traffic adaptive without any need for complex and yet inflexible metrics; it is inherently adaptive to all kinds of long-term variations in topology and traffic demand, which are difficult to be taken into account by deterministic approaches. By adding a threshold value factor to ACO, the black hole attack is not only detected, but also prevented. Hence, by using ACO(with threshold value factor) as a routing algorithm in MANETS, one can also be sure of not being susceptible to black hole attacks. Our prevention scheme detects the malicious nodes and isolates it from the active data forwarding and routing and reacts by sending ALARM packet to its neighbors. We also infer that a more detailed research and with some add-on features to ACO, the other security threats can also be detected and to a certain extent prevented like the way we have proposed for the black hole attack.

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AUTHORS PROFILE

A.Radhika did M.C.A and M.Tech (Computer Science & Engineering) degree respectively. Presently pursuing Doctorate Degree (Ph.D) in Computer Science from Rayalaseema University, Kurnool and working as Senior Assistant Professor in Computer Science & Engineering Department in S.R.K Institute of Technology. Her research interest includes Wireless networks, Mobile computing, Security, Routing Protocols, Trust metric measurement on MANET.

Dr. D.Haritha received Ph.D in Computer Science in 2005 from Central University. She is working as Professor & Head in the Department of Computer Science & Engineering. Her research interest includes computer networks, Network Security, Data Mining and Image Processing. She is presently guiding 2 Ph.D scholars.